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Abstract
Hurricane Katrina devastated the state of Louisiana in 2005. Using the syn-
thetic control method, we evaluate the effect of this disaster on income inequality
in Louisiana. The findings suggest that the disaster has an inequality-increasing
impact on the income shares of the top 0.1% and top 1% of income earners in the
immediate year following its occurrence. We find evidence of heterogeneous effects
of the disaster among income earners on the top decile. The effect of the disaster is
positive and statistically significant for the top 1% income share, but it is negative
and insignificant for the income shares of the next 9%. Our empirical exercise also
indicates that the effect from the first year is not persistent and evolves into a highly
volatile pattern in the medium-term. We also find that Hurricane Katrina has a
negligible effect on inequality in the long-term. Our results are robust to various
specification checks and to the inclusion of a rich set of inequality measures.
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1 Introduction
How do catastrophic natural disasters affect income inequality? This question is of ut-
most interest for social scientists given the recent rise in income disparities through the
developed world, coupled with an increase in natural disasters due to the current cli-
mate crisis. Few studies have tried to explore the relationship between natural disasters
and income inequality using either cross country comparisons (for example, Yamamura,
2015) or within country variations (for example, Miljkovic and Miljkovic, 2014; Pleninger,
2020). The current body of evidence is far from conclusive due to the methodological
complexities of measuring income inequality in areas devastated by natural catastrophes;
the difficulties of implementing econometric methods that can properly estimate causal
effects, and also because the effect of large catastrophic events may be different than the
effect of events with lesser destruction.
This paper focuses on the case of Hurricane Katrina, one of the deadliest natural
disasters to ever hit the United States. The most affected state was Louisiana having a
death-toll of more than 1,800 people. Apart from the loss of life, the hurricane destroyed
around 300,000 homes, and led to displacement of nearly 770,000 individuals.12 This
type of natural disasters could have long-lasting impacts on people’s live and may lead
to general changes in the economy. Precise state-level income inequality data exists for
the United States, which facilitates the study of our relationship of interest.
We explore the relationship between Hurricane Katrina and income inequality us-
ing the synthetic control method for quantitative case studies developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003). This methodology creates a statistical synthetic control that simu-
lates what would have happened to an observed treated unit in the absence of treatment.3
In our case, we create a synthetic Louisiana in the form of a weighted average of states
that were not affected by hurricane Katrina selected based on terms of trends of the
inequality measure, income per capita, and other economic and demographic character-
istics that we use as predictors. Then, the differences in inequality between the actual
Louisiana and the synthetic control in the post-Katrina period can be attributed to the
natural disaster. After that, we perform various robustness tests and sensitivity analyses
to verify the validity of our findings.
We use four baseline measures to measure inequality: the top 0.1% and top 1% income
shares, the next top 9%, and the dispersion ratio between the top 1% and the next 9%.4
Our findings indicate that Hurricane Katrina had an inequality-increasing effect in 2006,
the first year after the disaster. However, these results become less clear in the following
years. From 2007 to 2013, we observe high levels of volatility in our baseline inequality
measures. Then, by 2014 and 2015, the last years covered in this study, the differences
between actual and synthetic Louisiana vanish. This suggests that Hurricane Katrina had
null long-term effects on inequality. As a robustness check, we investigate the relationship
between Katrina and ten alternative inequality measures including the top 10% and top
5% income shares, the dispersion ratio between the top 10% and the bottom 90%, the
Gini coefficient, and other inequality measures. We find that in general Katrina had a
1US Census Bureau, “Hurricane Katrina 10th Anniversary: Aug. 29”, https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff16.html, accessed May 17, 2021.
2The White House of President George W. Bush, “Chapter One: Katrina in Perspective.” https://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter1.html, ac-
cessed May 17, 2021.
3For a recent and detailed description of the synthetic control method, refer to Abadie (2021).
4The bottom nine percentiles of the top decile (P90-P99) is known as the next 9%.
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positive short run effect in income inequality using the alternative measures; however,
again, this effect is not everlasting.
This paper relates to the literature linking natural disasters with income inequality.
We contribute to this literature by estimating the treatment effect of Hurricane Katrina,
one of the major disasters to ever hit the United States, in a large number of inequality
measures using a novel estimation strategy as the synthetic control method. Majority of
the existing studies that link natural disasters with inequality use the Gini coefficient as
their main inequality measurement.5 In this study, we use the income shares earned by
the top of the income distribution and dispersion rates as our main inequality measures.
These measures let us explore what happens at the very top income group and disentangle
the distributional effect of Hurricane Katrina.
This study also contributes to the literature that investigates the economic impact
of Hurricane Katrina. Various studies have shown the effects that the hurricane had
on the local economy, income, inequality, and social capital (see Ewing et al., 2007;
Deryugina et al., 2018; Shaughnessy et al., 2010; Hawkins and Maurer, 2010; Wang and
Ganapati, 2018). Shaughnessy et al. (2010) study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on
income distributions immediately and two years after the hurricane. The authors find
that the disaster had inequality-decreasing effects in the city of New Orleans. Focusing
on the whole state of Louisiana, our findings contrast with those of Shaughnessy et al.
(2010). We find inequality-increasing effects in the short run and a null-effects in the
long run using a richer set of inequality measures. Furthermore, unlike previous studies,
we carefully estimate a causal effect of the hurricane on inequality.
The outline of the rest of this papers is as follows: Section 2 is the background where
we briefly delineate the economic impact of hurricane Katrina. Section 3 provides the
conceptual framework, briefly refers to the existing literature of inequality and natural
disasters, and develops the main hypotheses of this study. Section 4 explains the data
and the variables used in our empirical exercise. Section 5 describes the methodology and
statistical inference. Section 6 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section
7 concludes this paper.
2 Background
Hurricane Katrina came ashore in southern Louisiana on August 29, 2005. With more
than 1,800 deaths in its wake, this devastating force of nature has been one of the dead-
liest single natural disasters to ever hit the United States. Aside from the significant
loss of life, Hurricane Katrina led to the displacement of 770,000 people and destroyed
or made uninhabitable 300,000 housing units, ultimately leaving thousands of people
homeless.6 From an economic perspective, Katrina caused enormous destruction adding
up to damages of more than 172 billion US Dollar.7 In Louisiana, the production levels
of fundamentally important goods such as oil, gas, sugar, seafood, and chemicals were
substantially reduced, causing several hundreds of millions of US Dollar worth of damage
5There are some exceptions, for example see Pleninger (2020)
6According to official information from the White House and the Government Accountability Office
available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/
chapter1.html and https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-81.pdf, accessed May 17, 2021.
7The cost value is adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2021 US Dollars. In 2005, the cost estimation
was 150 billion USD.
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and ending in dramatic price spikes for refined products.8 Until today, it has been the
costliest tropical storm to have struck the United States.
When a hurricane of higher category strikes and makes landfall, it has the potential
to affect large numbers of people, leaving an obvious path of destruction. Individuals
or cities, however, may be impacted to varying degrees. For example, as an immediate
consequence of Hurricane Katrina, around 80% of New Orleans (LA) was flooded as
levees designed to cope with hurricanes up to category three began to break and leak. It is
documented that the worst flooding occurred in the city’s 9th ward, an area that is largely
uninsured and characterized by lower income opportunities (Amadeo, 2018). The ability
of individuals or households to evacuate before the hurricane hits as well as their ability
to return to the destroyed area for rebuilding homes and businesses varies depending on
wealth and income. Pastor et al. (2006) argue that natural disasters and rescues do not
have egalitarian effects but instead impose disproportionate environmental injustice to
more vulnerable groups at the lower income levels. Analyzing the effects of Hurricane
Katrina, Landry et al. (2007) find evidence that higher income households are more likely
to migrate back home in the months immediately following this devastating natural event
due to superior endowment of monetary resources. Using data at the country-level, Kahn
(2005) shows that economies with more equal distributions of income suffer fewer deaths
from disasters. Whereas Hurricane Katrina induced sharp disruptions to Louisiana’s local
economy, business structures, population, and workforce, the varying intensity to which
individuals or households of different income levels were affected by the storm has not
only considerably changed the state’s economic, political, and social environment, but
also its income distribution and income inequality levels.
Given this, understanding Hurricane Katrina’s impact on the income distribution is
of critical importance. There is need for political decisionmakers to estimate differenti-
ating income distribution effects from disaster-driven fluctuations and from other impact
factors. Using a novel method, our study is the first to employ a rich set of inequality
measures related to the income distribution and income inequality levels, trying to inves-
tigate short-term inequality shocks in the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina, and potential
long-term convergence back to a stable path.
3 Theory, literature review, and hypotheses
3.1 Framework and literature review
The income inequality literature provides two competing and contrasting economic the-
ories, leaving the effects of natural disasters on income distribution ex ante ambiguous.
According to the vulnerability argument, income inequality is expected to widen in the
wake of natural disasters. It states that the economically less privileged individuals
and people without property ownership are more vulnerable as they are more likely to
experience losing their jobs, being injured, having to be evacuated and displaced, and
paying higher rents due to reduced housing stock (Howell and Elliott, 2019; Yamamura,
2015). For this group, each of these risks imposes a critical financial liability. Even with
the presence of safety nets such as insurance risk and cost coverage or disaster-related
aid programmes, it may take years for people further down the income distribution to




recover from a natural disaster. It is also theorized that small businesses and people
working in the informal sectors suffer from declines in their incomes (Yamamura, 2015).
Another vulnerability factor relates to disaster prevention. Poor people might systemat-
ically reside in areas with lower security standards such as old and unmaintained levees
or structurally poor quality housing that have a higher probability to collapse during a
disaster (Zoraster, 2010).9
On the contrary, the risk argument anticipates decreasing income inequality between
the rich and the poor. Top income earners and the more affluent classes are likely to
possess assets of higher economic value, and thus are more prone to bear the highest ab-
solute economic damage (Masozera et al., 2007). Additionally, the source of income could
influence the individual’s risk level when exposed to natural disasters. The rich generate
income from businesses and capital which could be more volatile in periods of natural
disasters, whereas the low-and middle classes primarily rely on risk-free salaries and fi-
nancial substitutions by unemployment insurances in case of unemployment (Pleninger,
2020).10 Given this ambiguity, we first introduce a brief literature review of empirical
results before formulating our hypothesis of interest.
Empirical studies put their focus on investigating the effects of natural disasters ei-
ther on economic growth (see Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Loayza et al., 2012; Felbermayr
and Gröschl, 2014; Hallegatte, 2015), or on income development (see Deryugina, 2017),
instead of analyzing the resulting and changing patterns of income distributions. Thus,
empirical evidence for causal effects on the income distribution running from natural dis-
asters has been left fairly uncharted. Only a few studies have attempted to deal with
the relationship of interest. Using a cross-country panel data design, Yamamura (2015)
finds evidence for short-run increases in income inequality, but the effect disappears in
the long-run. However, the study is limited to the extent that it only exploits five-year
averages, losing much of the data’s annual variation. Other studies exploiting panel data
are restricted to data from the United States. At the state-level, findings from Miljkovic
and Miljkovic (2014) suggest inequality-increasing effects of hurricanes, concluding that
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient grows by 5.4% for every 100bn US
Dollar of economic damages caused by hurricanes. At the county-level, Pleninger (2020)
reports decreasing effects on incomes, where the middle incomes are most adversely af-
fected by natural disasters. When measuring income inequality for households by the
Palma ratio, her results also indicate a widening gap between the shares of top incomes
and the shares of incomes at the lower end of the distribution (Pleninger, 2020). Further-
more, by relying on US county-level data, Howell and Elliott (2019) show a positive and
dynamic link between wealth inequality and natural disasters. Interestingly, they find
evidence that aid provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency appears to
exacerbate wealth inequality, probably as it is systematically designed to restore property
rather than communities.
Other case studies concentrate on regional effects of hurricanes on income inequality
in the United States. In their respective research work, Masozera et al. (2007) and Logan
(2006) both examine whether neighborhoods in New Orleans were impacted differently by
9Although the flooding levels were not different between low- and high-income communities in New
Orleans(Masozera et al., 2007), the population in more severely damaged areas lived disproportionately
below the poverty line (20.9% vs. 15.3%), showed higher unemployment rates 7.6% vs. 6.0%), was nearly
half black (45.8% vs. 26.4%), and primarily lived in rental housing (45.7% vs. 30.9%) compared to areas
that experienced only limited damage (Logan, 2006).
10In this context, the terms “vulnerability argument” and “risk argument” were first used by Pleninger
(2020).
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Hurricane Katrina based on pre-existing socio-economic conditions. They infer that the
storm’s impact was disproportionately borne by the poor, the unemployed, the people
who rented their homes, and by the African American population, hence confirming
significant inequalities in the ability of different income groups to respond and recover
from the storm and flood. By applying several density functions for modeling income
inequality before and after Hurricane Katrina, Shaughnessy et al. (2010) show inequality-
decreasing effects. Their best fitted model based on a log-logistic distribution indicates
decreasing levels of the Gini coefficient in New Orleans from 0.5881 before Katerina to
0.5776 after Katerina, and 0.5604 in 2007. Their data also reveals migration of the lowest
income groups from the affected area which was likely to have an impact on changes in
the income distribution.
Although all these empirical findings, with the exception of Shaughnessy et al. (2010),
support the vulnerability argument, evidence from studies examining the effects of nat-
ural disasters on income inequality in Asian developing countries is less conclusive. For
instance, Keerthiratne and Tol (2018) exploit six survey periods of district-level panel
data in Sri Lanka and find inequality-decreasing effects where the richer quintiles of the
income distribution disproportionately bear the highest natural disaster damages. Case
studies investigating the impact of Cyclone Aila in Sundarbans region in Bangladesh in
2009 (Abdullah et al., 2016) and of the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008 (Feng et al.,
2016) present either inequality-decreasing effects or no effects on income inequality. In
the aftermaths of both events, household incomes were spread more equitably across the
different income groups. Bui et al. (2014) analyse the Vietnam Household Living Stan-
dard Survey from 2008 and find inequality-increasing effects on Vietnamese households
induced by natural disasters.
3.2 Hypotheses development
Most of the previous empirical studies tend to corroborate the vulnerability argument.
This is especially the case for studies related to natural disasters in the United States.
Effects of Hurricane Katrina might lead to the consequence that the low-and middle-
income groups would bear higher income losses than the top income earners which in
turn would cause greater income inequality. Therefore, we hypothesize and test that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Hurricane Katrina has a positive impact on top income shares.
The literature of inequality economics highlights differences across the heterogeneous
income share groups at the very top (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Roine et al., 2009).
The source of such heterogeneity are differences in income types, with capital income
mainly being generated by higher income groups. It is argued that the capital share of
total income is continuously decreasing with income (Pleninger, 2020). In addition to
the higher volatility of capital income, the rich might also loose income deriving capital
assets. Consequently, the effects of natural disasters might even vary between different
top income share groups. Therefore, we would expect that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The impact of Hurricane Katrina is different across top income
share levels.
In the United States, the income gap between top income groups and the bottom
90% as well as within the group of top income earners has dramatically widened. It
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could be argued that income groups ranked higher in the distribution pyramid would
be more resilient to storms or even benefit during the phase of economic recovery. To
test whether the effects of natural disasters on income inequality are pro-rich, we apply
several dispersion ratios and formulate our third hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The impact of Hurricane Katrina is pro-rich and increases the
income gap within the top decile.
4 Data and inequality measures
In our analysis, we exploit annual state-level panel data for the period between 1960 and
2015. The event year is consistent with the time of landfall made by Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, giving us 45 years of preintervention data. Louisiana presents the treatment
state, whereas all unaffected states form the donor pool needed to create control unit.
Operational definitions and original data sources are provided in Table A.1.
4.1 Outcome variables
Our outcome variables of primary interest relate to a rich set of alternative income in-
equality measures. The high complexity of measuring income distributions (Deaton, 2013)
and the absence of a superior inequality measure requires us to account for the different
ways to look at income inequality. One way to understand inequality is to examine the
income distribution at different income group levels. Given an unequal income distribu-
tion, top decile income groups show disproportionately higher income shares compared
to their population share, while bottom decile income groups exhibit disproportionately
lower income shares. For an advanced analysis of the income distribution, Jenkins (2009)
proposes to incorporate several indices that focus on changes in different income ranges.
Top income shares are able to specifically measure the income dynamics of the more af-
fluent income groups. Leigh (2007) finds empirical evidence that top income shares are
strongly related to other measures of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient and
advocates their utilization especially when other inequality measures are not available
or are of low quality. Thus, in the first instance, our outcome variable is defined as the
pre-tax national income share held by the top 1% of the income distribution. We also
apply other income share measures within the top decile, like the ones at the top 0.1%
level or the next 9% level, as the literature of inequality economics highlights differences
across the heterogeneous income share groups, especially at the distribution’s top. (see
Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Roine et al., 2009).11 Data related to top income shares is
taken from the World Inequality Database (WID) and refers to pre-tax and pre-transfer
income. The WID provides a systematic framework to derive income share data from
administrative tax sources, thus ensuring comparability over time and space.
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the distributive consequences of Hurricane Ka-
trina at the very top, we use dispersion ratios that express the income share of the rich
as a multiple of other shares. For example, the “top 1% to next 9%” dispersion ratio
(P99/(P90-P99)) is able to measure the distribution of income directly within the top
11The source of such heterogeneity are differences in income types, with capital income mainly being
generated by higher income groups (Pleninger, 2020). In addition to the higher volatility of capital
income, the rich might also loose income deriving capital assets in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Consequently, the effects of natural disasters might vary between different top income share groups.
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decile of income earners. This allows us to examine which particular income group may
be most affected by relating different income groups with one another. Relating different
income groups with one another allows the examination of potential shifts between them.
A corresponding increase would signify a pro-rich development, for example from the
next 9% to the top 1% income earners. The dispersion ratios deployed in this analysis
are based on our own calculations and are built on the income shares sourced from the
WID data series. We are convinced that utilizing top income shares and dispersion ra-
tios qualifies to extend the current understanding of how Hurricane Katrina might have
shaped the income distribution at its top.
As a complement to these examinations of inequality, the Gini coefficient presents a
single convenient measure to summarize the entire income distribution. Although it meets
the desirable axioms for a proper inequality measure (Haughton and Khandker, 2009), it
has its own noteworthy issues. The Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes located in
the middle of the income distribution (Frémeaux and Piketty, 2014). Additionally, several
income distributions very different from each other can present the same Gini coefficient
because the Lorenz curve can assume various shapes even when the size of the measured
area is identical (Afonso et al., 2015). Based on this argument, Hesse (2016) goes a step
further and offensively expresses surprise at the dominant use of the Gini coefficient in
statistical analysis. Conclusively, the Gini coefficient is appropriate to quantify general
inequality levels but possesses limited analytical value to explain changes at different
points within the income distribution. Awareness of this relevant limitation has made us
recognize that most of the previous studies which either strongly or even exclusively focus
on using the Gini coefficient as preferred income inequality measure leave many aspects
of the income distribution dynamics widely untapped. As we aim to provide a complete
picture on the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the income distribution at the very top
but also on measures of inequality levels that examine combined effects from the top and
the bottom, we analyse data for the Gini coefficient coming from Mark W. Frank. In his
work, Frank (2014) constructs and constantly updates a set of annual state-level income
inequality measures derived from individual tax data sources.12
Other alternative measures obtained from Frank (2014) and applied in the robustness
analysis include the Atkinson index, the relative mean deviation and Theil’s entropy in-
dex.13 While all are constructed in a way to assess inequality over the entirety of the
income distribution, each of these three presents a different class of inequality measures
with differences in terms of decomposability and transfer principles (Frank, 2014). For
calculating the relative mean deviation, the population divides into one group that re-
ceives less than or equal to mean income and another one with incomes above the mean.
It can be defined as the percentage of total income that should be transferred from the
richer income group to the other group with incomes below the mean; so, that both
groups have an identical mean income (Kakwani, 1980). Technically, this measure varies
in a range from zero to two, with larger values signifying higher income inequality (Frank,
2014). The Atkinson index is based on a social welfare function and incorporates some
social justice into the measurement of income inequality. It aims to compute the pro-
portion of total income that would be required to attain an equal level of social welfare
as at present if incomes were perfectly distributed (De Maio, 2007). The measure is
12Our data was last updated in January 2021. To download the pertinent data set provided by M.W.
Frank please access: www.shsu.edu/~eco_mwf/inequality.html.
13For a detailed and technical explanation of the alternative measures please see Frank (2014),
Haughton and Khandker (2009) and Kakwani (1980).
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bound between zero and one, where zero indicates no need for reallocation of incomes to
achieve an equal level of social welfare. A higher value, for example 0.3, implies that an
equal level of social welfare can be realized with merely 70% of the current total income
(1–0.3 = 70%), indicating that 30% of income would not even have to be generated if
income were just equally distributed. In other words, if a richer individual renounces
parts of its income to achieve a more equal income distribution, less income is required to
realize the same social welfare level. However, this depends on an individual’s willingness
to accept a lower income level in exchange for a more equally distributed income distri-
bution. Indeed, the Atkinson index depends on the degree of a population’s aversion to
inequality, a theoretical sensitivity parameter chosen by the researcher to weight incomes
(Afonso et al., 2015). By varying the value of the inequality aversion parameter which
ranges from zero to infinity, the Atkinson index becomes sensitive to incomes at different
parts of its distribution. The one employed by Frank (2014) equals 0.5, a value more
sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution. Finally, the Theil’s entropy in-
dex compares the income and population distribution structures, analysing discrepancies
between the distribution of income and the distribution of population between defined
income groups (Conceição and Ferreira, 2000). If all income groups have an income share
equal to their population share, the overall Theil’s entropy index is zero (Conceição and
Ferreira, 2000). This presents a state of equal income distribution. Larger relative dis-
tances translate into higher levels of income inequality. The Theil’s entropy index as the
advantageous characteristic to be decomposable and to satisfy the transfer principles, as
well as the feature to assign a weight to distances between incomes in different parts of
the income distribution (Frank, 2014; Afonso et al., 2015).
4.2 Predictor variables
To achieve a good preintervention matching of the Synthetic Control Group over an ex-
tended period of time, it is essential to use an appropriate set of predictor variables.
Among the most important drivers of income inequality at the country-level suggested
by the literature are economic factors such as: economic growth and openness; techno-
logical progress; financial development; and the presence of systematic banking crises; as
well as political factors like decreases in strength of trade unions, top marginal tax rates,
and government spending (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Roine et al., 2009; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2009; Neal, 2013; Dorn and Schinke, 2018; Huber et al., 2019). Our selected
predictors are in accordance with the previous literature on inequality. First, economic
development is defined as the logarithm of personal income per capita in nominal terms,
and as such it controls for any distributional effect due to different income levels. The
personal income consists of wages, proprietor’s income, dividends, interest, rents, and
government benefits. As such it also controls for any distributional effect due to social
security transfers. Data is retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).14 To
account for changes in population demographics and shifts in labor market resources,
we include the total population and total employment numbers by state. Data for both
measures are also sourced from the BEA. The main variables to capture effects of educa-
tion on income inequality are taken from Frank (2009) who developed two human capital
attainment-to-population ratios, one related to high school attainment and the other
linked to college attainment. These can be interpreted as the percentage of total popu-




Due to a lack of direct measures related to state-level taxation laws, labor market
regulation, and the size of government activity, we deploy three subindices of the Eco-
nomic Freedom Index provided by the Fraser Institute in order to capture those effects
on income inequality.15 Each subindex ranges between 0 and 10, with the highest score
indicating the highest degree of economic freedom (Stansel et al., 2020). For example, the
subindex related to the size of government activity is lower for states described by growing
levels of government consumption expenditures, greater levels of transfers and subsidies,
higher number of mandatory government programs to pay for retirement and disability
insurances (Stansel et al., 2020). Second, higher tax burdens on incomes and properties
translate into lower scores of taxation subindex (Stansel et al., 2020). Third, lower scores
of the subindex related to labor market regulations are a result of higher minimum wages
that restrict the ability to freely negotiate contracts, more restrictive hiring and firing
regulations, and stronger centralized collective bargaining power (Stansel et al., 2020).
Admittedly, each subindex is evaluated through the lens of how supportive or destructive
it is for economic freedom, but given the underlying objective scale of judgment, we firmly
believe that these measures provide indirect indications on potentially important devel-
opments related to income inequality. Thus, we prefer to include these indirect measures




The empirical objective of this paper is to estimate the treatment effect of Hurricane
Katrina on different inequality measurements in order to test our hypotheses developed
in section 3. In applied economics, the most reliable impact evaluation strategy to es-
timate a treatment effect is randomized control trials (RCT), where the researcher can
experimentally assign units of observation to treatment and control groups. In empirical
exercises exploring issues with natural disasters applying RCT is obviously impossible.
However, we can exploit the fact that the majority of the destruction of Hurricane Ka-
trina occurred mostly in the state of Louisiana. Given this, we treat Hurricane Katrina
as a natural experiment to explore the relationship between natural disasters and in-
equality. Since we use annual state-level panel data where only a handful of states were
“treated” (i.e. affected by the natural disaster), the most appropriate methodology to
estimate the causal effect of the Hurricane Katrina on inequality is the synthetic control
method for comparative case studies developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
later expanded in Abadie et al. (2010).
We use the synthetic control method to estimate the treatment effect of Hurricane
Katrina on top income shares and other commonly used inequality measurements in the
state of Louisiana. This method uses a weighted combination of untreated units, called
donors, to create, in our case, a synthetic Louisiana that works as a counterfactual of
what would have happened to Louisiana if Hurricane Katrina would not have occurred.
Differences in our outcome of interest between the observed and synthetic Louisiana
after the disaster can be attributed to Hurricane Katrina. In order to construct synthetic
15Data is available at www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom, access July 2021.
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Louisiana, we use all states in the United States with available data in the World Income
Inequality database that were not directly affected by the hurricane.16
The most crucial concerns when implementing a synthetic control method are the
following: the length of the pre-treatment period, the choice of donor states, the use
of appropriate predictor variables, and the assignment of weights across states. First,
in synthetic control method a long pre-treatment period is necessary to create a valid
counterfactual since the credibility of the method depends on how well, in our case,
synthetic Louisiana tracks actual Louisiana. We include data from 1960, that is 45 years
before Hurricane Katrina, allowing us to have a convincing fit before the disaster. Second,
the synthetic control method requires that the pool of donor units include states with
similar socioeconomic characteristics as the treated unit. In our case, the donor states
used in the analysis include all states in the US where data is available. Note that we
exclude states that were affected by Hurricane Katrina since including them could bias
the true effect of the disaster on inequality. Third, to properly construct a synthetic
control method, we need to include predictor variables that affect inequality both before
and after the treatment. To construct synthetic Louisiana, we use variables that are
in accordance with previous studies on inequality. Furthermore, we include inequality
indicators from 1961 to 2001 in five years intervals as predictors.17 Finally, based on
those states and predictors, we select weights that minimize the difference between the
pre-Katrina inequality between actual and synthetic Louisiana. The weights on each
state in the donor pool are non-negative and together they sum to one. In our empirical
exercise, many states are assigned a weight very close to zero, with only a small number
of states receiving non-zero weight for each outcome variable.
The synthetic control method is a novel methodology for quantitative case studies as
it let us estimate treatment effects for situations where a single unit is treated. As argued
by Rubolino and Waldenström (2020), the synthetic control method has some advantages
over regression models such as difference in differences and fixed effect regressions. First,
it relies on an algorithm to create the control unit, so researchers cannot deliberately
choose the control region. Secondly, this method is transparent given that it allows to
keep track of the exact weight of each donor unit used and the precise weight that each
predictor variable has in the analysis. Finally, the synthetic control method allows the
effects of unobserved variables on the outcome to vary over time (Abadie et al., 2010).
Migration may pose a threat to our identification strategy if the decision or possibility
to migrate differs by economic conditions. We can illustrate this with two extreme exam-
ples. First, massive net out-migration of only the poorest income earners would lead to
an increase in the average income of the bottom of the 90% of the income distribution.
This could very well translate into a decrease of the top income shares given that the av-
erage income of the society would increase. Second, large out-migration of the top income
earners would lead to a decrease in the average income of the whole society. This type of
selective migration of the richest members of society would change the composition of the
top income earners as individuals who previously were not part of the top of the income
distribution will become part of it. As in the first example, this compositional change may
result in a decrease on the top income shares given that richest individuals are excluded
16We exclude Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi because they were partially affected by Hurricane
Katrina. Indiana and Montana are not included since WID does not provide precise information on top
income shares for them. Finally, we don’t include Washington, D.C. since it’s not considered a state.
17As robustness checks, we consider different years and inequality averages as predictors. The results
are mostly identical.
11
from the income distribution. These examples are extreme cases of selection and unlikely
to occur, but they indicate that our synthetic control results would underestimate the
true effect of Hurricane Katrina on top income shares if the disaster disproportionately
affects the out-migration decision of either the richest or the poorest members of society.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there were huge mobilizations outside of the city
of New Orleans towards non-devastated regions. Internal reallocations within the state
of Louisiana together with out-migration towards eastern parts of the state of Texas were
common coping strategies for affected individuals. According to the 2006 American Com-
munity Survey organized by the U.S. Census Bureau, an estimated 118,552 individuals
who resided in Louisiana in 2005 migrated to Texas by 2006. Lower-income households
were more likely to out-migrate from Louisiana to counties like Harris and Dallas in the
state of Texas than their wealthier counterparts (Fussell, 2015). This suggests that the
estimated effect of Hurricane Katrina on inequality, in the short-run, is likely to be un-
derestimated. It’s more difficult to understand the sign of the possible migration-induced
bias in the mid- and long-run after Hurricane Katrina because in-migration to Louisiana
could be a combination of returnees and outsiders attracted by the revitalized economy.
5.2 Inference
We also provide information about the statistical significance of the estimated treatment
effects. Following Cavallo et al. (2013), we use permutation tests for each year after the
natural disaster. To obtain p-values, we first reassign the treatment to all control units in
the donor pool that were originally not exposed to the storm. Then, we iteratively apply
the synthetic control method as if they were affected by Hurricane Katrina. Each time the
actually affected state of Louisiana is shifted into the donor pool, replacing the respective
control unit. After implementing the simulated placebos, we obtain each year’s treatment
effect for each placebo analysis. Intuitively, we would expect the respective placebo effect
to be close to zero. This is due to the simple fact that there was no treatment from
which an effect could have occurred. Finally, we rank the actual year-specific effect of
Hurricane Katrina on Louisiana’s outcome of interest in the distribution of the values
of the year-specific placebo effects. The p-values are the proportion of placebo effects
with a larger estimated effect than the observed effect of Hurricane Katrina on actual
Louisiana’s inequality for each period after the natural disaster. If the distribution of
placebo tests performed generate many placebo effects of similar or larger magnitude as
the one found for actual Louisiana, then our results would rather be observed by chance
instead of exhibiting robust evidence for an impact on Hurricane Katrina on income
inequality (Galiani and Quistorff, 2017).
Units with high pre-treatment root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) may be
more volatile in any posttreatment year than units with low RMSPE due to poor fit
(Absher et al., 2020). We deal with this concern in two ways. First, as in Absher et al.
(2020), we divide each effect (both placebos and real) by the pre-treatment root mean
squared prediction error; therefore, we report standardized p-values. Secondly, to obtain
the p-values, we do not include states where the RMSPE is 2.0 greater than Louisiana’s
RMSPE in the pre-treatment period.
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6 Results
This section serves to first transparently summarize the outputs concerning the con-
struction of synthetic Louisiana. This involves displaying the weights assigned to each
predictor variable as well as to states in the donor pool. Then, we present our main
results obtained by applying the Synthetic Control Method. The four defined baseline
inequality measures include the top 0.1% and top 1% income shares, the next 9%, and
the dispersion ratio between the top 1% and the next 9%. This section completes with
the performance of robustness tests.
6.1 Baseline results
6.1.1 Construction of Synthetic Louisiana
The creation of a control unit that best resembles the pre-treatment characteristics of ac-
tual Louisiana is essential for the validity of our analysis. Indeed, the synthetic Louisiana
for each inequality measure was constructed as a weighted average of some states chosen
from the donor pool and was based on selected predictor weights. To ensure a high degree
of transparency in the composition of the respective synthetic Louisiana, we provide the
pertinent information in the following tables.
Table 1: Donor pool states and share to construct synthetic Louisiana
State Weight
Top 0.1% Top 1% Next9% T1/N9 ratio
Kentucky 0.024 0 0.169 0.211
New Mexico 0 0 0 0.078
Ohio 0 0 0.123 0
Tennessee 0.227 0.312 0.303 0.172
Texas 0.252 0.234 0.074 0.248
West Virginia 0.496 0.454 0.330 0.291
Note: Only donor states with non-trivial weight are shown.
Table A5 shows all the donor states and their weight.
Table 1 shows the weights of control states used to compose the synthetic control.
Across all four baseline inequality measures, West Virginia is the most heavily weighted,
with weights ranging from 29.1% to 49.6%. Another commonality is the selection of
Tennessee and Texas as relevant donor states, albeit showing varying weights. The top
1% income share only consists of three donor states, while the other baseline inequality
measures are based on four to five donor states. It appears that none of the synthetic
controls is disproportionally driven by only a single donor state.
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Table 2: Synthetic Louisiana predictor weights
Top 0.1% Top 1% Next 9% T1/N9 ratio
Variables Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Top 0.1% Income Share 0.1272
Top 1% Income Share 0.0232
Next 9% Income Share 0.0562
T1/N9 Ratio 0.0000
Log Income per capita 0.2497 0.0082 0.0290 0.0002
Log Population 0.1250 0.2218 0.0310 0.9971
Log Employment 0.1168 0.6766 0.8567 0.0018
ECF Taxation 0.0131 0.0087 0.0027 0.0000
ECF Government Spending 0.0181 0.0240 0.0068 0.0000
ECF Labor Market Regulations 0.2043 0.0041 0.0121 0.0000
High School Attainment 0.0494 0.0222 0.0000 0.0000
College Attainment 0.0964 0.0113 0.0055 0.0008
Note: This table shows the predictor weights to create synthetic Louisiana
In addition to this, examining the predictor weights sheds further light into the com-
position of the synthetic controls. Table 2 lists the weights given to each predictor based
on the standard method that includes all states as donor states. Lagged outcome variables
are often referred to as an important predictor but also have the potential to absorb too
much prediction power from other predictors. In our analysis, none of the four baseline
inequality measures gives too much weight to their respective lags, allowing other predic-
tors to receive adequate weights as well. The income share of the top 0.1% is the most
balanced, with the heaviest weight of around 25% is assigned to the logarithmized income
per capita. This contrasts the strong weights given to the logarithmized employment in
case of the top 1% and the next 9% income shares. The prediction of the dispersion ratio
seems to solely concentrate on logarithmized population. Nevertheless, we are convinced
that the heavy weight assigned to logarithmized population in case of the dispersion ratio
is not a drawback of our analysis. As can be seen in the next subsections, this confidence
is based on congruent results obtained for the top 0.1% and top 1% income shares and
the dispersion ratio, even though each inequality measure possesses different predictor
weights.
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Table 3: Inequality predictor means: Baseline inequality measurements
Top 0.1% Top 1% Next 9% T1/N9 ratio
Variables Louisiana Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Top 0.1% Income Share 0.0439 0.0431
Top 1% Income Share 0.1237 0.1203
Next 9% Income Share 0.2624 0.2625
T1/N9 Ratio 0.4701 0.4518
Log Income per capita 8.9935 8.9968 9.0089 9.0076 9.0153
Log Population 1.3966 1.3541 1.3793 1.368 1.3963
Log Employment 0.6713 0.6353 0.6737 0.6670 0.7071
ECF Taxation 6.5371 5.8367 5.9998 5.8795 5.9748
ECF Government Spending 6.4551 6.7819 6.9902 6.7227 7.0789
ECF Labor Market Regulations 3.3642 3.4125 3.5249 3.5095 3.6375
High School Attainment 0.4122 0.4263 0.4271 0.4307 0.4258
College Attainment 0.0863 0.0821 0.0827 0.0823 0.0857
RMSPE - 0.0035 0.0059 0.0053 0.0210
Note: This table shows the indicator variables and the average pre-Katrina inequality for
observed and synthetic Louisiana.
Finally, we report the values of the predictor variables used in the baseline model
to find the optimal synthetic controls during the pre-treatment period. One of the key
outcomes of the Synthetic Control Method is the estimate of the root mean square pre-
dicted error (RMSPE) between the actual and synthetic Louisiana, measured in the
pre-treatment period. In table 3, the RMSPE is documented to show that the synthetic
controls are chosen to best fit the trajectories of the control variables and the respective
inequality measure. For all of them, the RMSPEs exhibit low levels ranging between
0.0035 and 0.0210, which translate into very close matches between actual and synthetic
Louisiana.
6.1.2 Comparison between Actual and Synthetic Louisiana
The causal effect of Hurricane Katrina on income inequality at the top of the distribution
is measured as the difference between the post-treatment trajectory of the respective top
income share for the treatment state of Louisiana and its synthetic control. The goodness
of fit of synthetic Louisiana is then assessed by calculating its deviation from the actual
Louisiana during the pre-treatment period. Figure 1 shows the trajectories of the four
defined baseline inequality measures for each actual and synthetic Louisiana. The blue
line represents the evolution of income inequality for actual Louisiana and the red one
for synthetic Louisiana. The vertical line marks the event year.
The pre-treatment trajectories observed for the top 0.1% and top 1% income shares
are well-replicated by their respective synthetic controls. This indicates that the post-
treatment trajectories of synthetic Louisiana provide a reasonable approximation to tra-
jectories that would have occurred if Hurricane Katrina would never have happened. This
pattern is confirmed by the other two baseline inequality measures, although the fit of
the next 9% trajectories experiences somewhat higher volatility with more fluctuating
deviations. The estimated effects of Hurricane Katrina on top 0.1% and top 1% income
shares mirror each other and only vary in terms of magnitude. In the year immediately
following Hurricane Katrina both measures experienced strong surges based on a year-to-
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Figure 1: Income inequality in Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina
Note: The figures show the trends for the baseline inequality measurements in Louisiana and synthetic
Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina.
year change, with the top 0.1% income share increasing by 36.22% and the top 1% income
share rising by 24.59%. Compared to the modest shifts of 2.07% and 2.96% for both top
income share measures in synthetic Louisiana, the observed increase in real Louisiana
was 8 to 12 times stronger. However, these effects are first inversed by sharp declines
of comparable magnitude in 2007, but then again turn positive with historically stark
growth rates of 79.37% observed for the top 0.1% income share, and 50.44% recorded for
the top 1% income share. This highly volatile pattern seems to phase down after an-
other sharp drop in both top income shares four years after the storm. Comparing these
actual developments with the ones obtained from the synthetic Louisiana suggests that
the evolution of both top income shares in the theoretical absence of Hurricane Katrina
would have been tremendously less volatile, and would have reached lower levels of in-
come inequality. Nevertheless, the differences between the actual and synthetic trajectory
in the first years of post-treatment period do not indicate neither inequality-increasing
nor inequality-decreasing effects. Instead, it can be inferred that Hurricane Katrina has
thoroughly shaken the income distribution at its very top. This high volatility was felt
more intensely by superrich income earners residing in the top 0.1% income share group.
Therefore, our hypothesis that Hurricane Katrina has a positive impact on top income
shares can only partially be confirmed for the first year after the storm. However, this
short-term inequality-increasing effect is not persistent. Any long-term effects are negligi-
ble, essentially because the prediction of the synthetic controls once more closely matches
the trajectory of actual Louisiana.
With respect to our second hypothesis, it could be seen that the impact of Hurricane
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Katrina is different across top income share groups. When analyzing the group of the next
9% of income earners, our empirical findings indeed show lasting differences between the
actual and synthetic trajectory for almost all years following the event year, indicating
negative impacts of Hurricane Katrina only for high income earners located in the next
9% of the income distribution. This would not only support our second hypothesis but
would also be in accordance with the vulnerability argument. Income earners in the lower
part of the top decile are more vulnerable than top 1% income earners. To investigate
the pro-rich effect of Hurricane Katrina, we included the dispersion ratio between the
top 1% and the next 9% into our main analysis. An increase in this ratio signifies a
widening income gap even within the more affluent income share groups located at the
top of the income pyramid. Although we observe a highly volatile pattern comparable
to the ones seen in the top 0.1% and top 1% income shares, we interpret our result as
inequality-increasing and thus as pro-rich over the course of the first three years following
the storm. We base this inference on the two large positive differences and the minor
negative difference between actual and synthetic Louisiana observed in the first three
years after the event. Again, long-term effects do not seem to play a role. Thus, we see
our third hypothesis as partially confirmed for the short run.
6.1.3 Analysis of Statistical Significance
After having calculated the treatment effect, we assess statistical significance of our main
results by running “in-space” placebo tests. One way to determine the validity of the
placebo tests is the eyeball test. Figure 2 portraits the results of the placebo tests obtained
for our set of main income inequality measures. The black line denotes the gap estimated
for Louisiana, which is the difference between actual Louisiana and its synthetic control.
Each of the grey lines marks the gap associated with each of the placebo tests performed,
showing the difference between each state in the donor pool and its respective synthetic
control. Again, the red line presents the treatment year.
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Figure 2: Placebo tests
Note: Each figure shows a series of placebo tests for different inequality measures. The bold line is
the difference between the observed Louisiana and the synthetic control and the gray lines represent the
placebo tests using the donor countries.
As the figure makes apparent for the cases of the top 0.1% and the top 1% income share
variables, the difference between actual Louisiana and its synthetic control is larger than
the same difference for most of the placebo states in the very first year of post-treatment
period, and continues to be seemingly more volatile in the following three years. We
interpret this pattern as first suggestive indication of causal effects of Hurricane Katrina
on income inequality at the very top of the distribution. The inference for the dispersion
ratio resembles this conclusion. For the income group of the next 9%, the placebo tests
confirm a negative impact of Hurricane Katrina due to the larger negative estimated
post-treatment gap of Louisiana compared to the same gaps observed for the majority of
the donor states. In the long run, however, the black lines of all four income inequality
measures appear to revert to the centre of the distribution of estimated gaps, indicating
that there is no treatment effect of Hurricane Katrina on income inequality five years after
the storm. Nevertheless, the analysis of appearance can only be interpreted as suggestive.
To quantitatively evaluate statistical significance, it has to be examined whether the
estimated treatment effect of actual Louisiana is large relative to the distribution of the
simulated treatment effects estimated for the states not exposed to the storm. From this
inferential exercise, a p-value can be constructed. According to Galiani and Quistorff
(2017), that p-value can be interpreted as the proportion of control units that have a
simulated treatment effect at least as large as the treatment effect obtained in actual
Louisiana. For each year in the post-treatment period, Table 4 reports the treatment
effect and the corresponding p-values. We also report standardized p-values, which par-
tially capture the possibility that poorly fit donor states may be highly volatile in the
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post-treatment period as explained in Section 5.
Table 4: The effect of Katrina on top income shares
Top 0.1% income share Top 1% income share
Year Effect p-value std p-value Effect p-value std p-value
2005 -0.000 1.000 1.000 -0.003 0.789 0.789
2006 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.026 0.000
2007 -0.016 0.105 0.026 -0.032 0.000 0.000
2008 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000
2009 0.001 0.842 0.842 0.000 1.000 1.000
2010 0.000 0.974 0.974 -0.000 1.000 1.000
2011 -0.0160 0.184 0.105 -0.019 0.237 0.211
2012 0.006 0.658 0.632 0.013 0.500 0.526
2013 0.009 0.394 0.316 0.014 0.316 0.421
2014 0.007 0.632 0.579 0.005 0.763 0.816
2015 -0.003 0.816 0.763 -0.008 0.632 0.526
Next 9% income share T1/N9 ratio
Year Effect p-value std p-value Effect p-value std p-value
2005 -0.006 0.282 0.282 -0.002 0.947 0.921
2006 -0.007 0.308 0.205 0.150 0.000 0.000
2007 -0.030 0.000 0.000 -0.045 0.342 0.368
2008 -0.010 0.436 0.410 0.212 0.000 0.000
2009 -0.017 0.205 0.103 0.015 0.789 0.763
2010 -0.023 0.154 0.077 0.024 0.684 0.658
2011 -0.017 0.308 0.128 -0.062 0.421 0.263
2012 -0.005 0.821 0.821 0.009 0.947 0.947
2013 -0.001 0.872 0.897 0.022 0.868 0.842
2014 -0.010 0.487 0.461 0.006 0.947 0.947
2015 -0.013 0.436 0.359 -0.044 0.500 0.421
Note: This table shows the annual treatment effects, p-values, and std p-values.
We find a positive causal impact of Hurricane Katrina in the first year following the
storm in three out of four income inequality measures that is statistically significant at
the 1% level. This holds for both p-values reported, albeit the treatment effect observed
for the top 1% income share in 2006 slightly expands to the 5% significance level. The
inequality-increasing effect only varies in magnitude. Compared to a scenario without
Hurricane Katrina, the respective income shares of the top 0.1% and top 1% are 2.8 and
3.5 percentage points higher. These differences reflect increased top income shares by
33.45% and 18.98%, respectively. For the dispersion ratio, we observe a similar increase
by 21.81%. The extremely volatile pattern observed in both top income share measures
shows statistical significance at the 1% level, and further indicates the disrupting short-
term impact of Hurricane Katrina on the income distribution at its higher end. Regarding
the dispersion ratio, we find statistical relevance for the sharp increases in the first and
third year following the storm, thus corroborating a causal and positive impact on the
widening income gap within the top decile. Although the income group of the next
9% consistently shows negative estimates, 2007 marks the only year in which we find a
statistically relevant impact. Nevertheless, a combined view on statistical significance and
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sign of the estimates in the post-treatment period indicate, admittingly to a somewhat
weaker degree, the income share loss of the next 9% of income earners. Overall, the
results obtained from the performed placebo tests propose a high level of significance
of the short-term effects of Hurricane Katrina on the highest top income shares and
the dispersion ratio. We find that the immediate effect of this devastating storm has
a dramatic inequality-increasing consequence. This finding partially confirms our first
hypothesis. Though, given the statistical significance of the following volatility in year
two and three after Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the inequality-increasing impact does
not seem to have a lot of staying power. Weaker evidence for an inequality-increasing
impact comes from the income group of the next 9%. Any long-term effects are not
statistically significant and thus negligible.
6.2 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we report robustness checks to our baseline findings using alternative
inequality measures. To validate our results, we also perform sensitivity tests by using
alternative specifications for our predictor variables, applying an RMSPE free of any
restrictions, and running the analysis without the most influential donor state that is
West Virginia.
6.2.1 Alternative inequality measures
We have presented evidence of the effect of Hurricane Katrina on income inequality using
four baseline inequality measures. Here, we seek to understand whether our findings
remain similar when we apply alternative top income shares and dispersion ratios, as
well as other inequality measures that summarize the entire income distribution. In
combination, Figures 3 and 4 plot the evolution of ten different inequality measures for
each pair of actual and synthetic Louisiana over the pre- and post-Katrina period. Across
all inequality measures, we use exactly the same states and predictors as those mentioned
in the previous subsections and, as before, in every estimation synthetic Louisiana closely
tracks actual Louisiana in the pre-Katrina period. To limit the number of tables presented
below, we refer to Table A.2, in the appendix, that shows the donor pool states and
their respective share to construct synthetic Louisiana for each of the different inequality
measures applied to substantiate robustness. For complete transparency, we present the
predictor weights and average predictor means for the entire set of alternative inequality
measures in Tables A.3 and A.4 respectively.
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Figure 3: Income inequality in Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina: Alternative
inequality measures I
Note: The figures show the trends for six alternative inequality measures categorized as top income
shares or dispersion ratios in actual and synthetic Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 3 shows the trends using the following measures: top 5%, top 10%, next 0.9%,
and next 4% income shares, and the top 0.1% to next 0.9% dispersion ratio and the top
10% to bottom 90% dispersion ratio. For the top income shares, the trends and effects
are similar to the ones presented in the baseline analysis. Note that in the first year
after the disaster occurred, the income share owned by the top 5%, top 10% and next
0.9% increased. However, as seen before, these income shares also become more volatile
in the flowing years. The income share of the next 4% is of particular interest since it
presents the top income share of those in the top 5% excluding the top 1% in the income
distribution. This allows us to further disentangle heterogenous effects within the top
ranked fifth percentile. It becomes clear that the estimated effect for this indicator is
constantly negative for the first five years after Katrina, but the trends of actual and
synthetic Louisiana seem to converge afterwards. From this, we conclude that Hurricane
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Katrina had heterogenous effects on the income share groups of the top 1% and the
next 4%. We also observed this heterogeneity between the top 1% and the next 9%.
However, given that the results of income share of the next 0.9% mirrors the ones seen
for the top 0.1% and top 1%, such heterogeneity remains unconfirmed for income share
groups of higher ranks. Finally, the income share ratios presented in Figure 3 follow the
same pattern shown so far; that is, the indicators increase in first year of the post-Katrina
period and in the next years the indicators are very volatile. In sum, the results presented
in Figure 3 corroborate our baseline findings indicating that Katrina had an inequality-
increasing effect only in the short-run. See Table A.5 for the estimated treatment effects
and statistical significance.
Figure 4: Income inequality in Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina: Alternative
inequality measures II
Note: The figures show the trends for four measure of general inequality in actual and synthetic
Louisiana before and after Hurricane Katrina.
We present the trends of actual and synthetic Louisiana before and after Katrina
using measures that compute more general inequality levels such as the Atkinson index,
Gini coefficient, Theil’s entropy index, and the relative mean deviation in Figure 4. For
each of those, we observe an increase in inequality in actual Louisiana compared to the
synthetic counterpart. Note that for most of these indicators, the estimated treatment
effect is positive and significant in the first years; however, the estimated effects become
small and statistically insignificant after the year 2010.
Given the computational and interpretative differences among the inequality mea-
sures, taking a closer analytical look at each of them further advances our understanding
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of various inequality dimensions. To start with, income inequality measured by the rel-
ative mean deviation would be 3.2 and 4.8 percentage points higher in actual Louisiana
in the first and second year after the storm. To attain an identical mean income for
everyone this means that 88.0% and 90.2% of the total income need to be transferred
from the richer to the less affluent income group. This is an increase of 3.8% and 5.6%
compared to synthetic Louisiana. As for the Theil’s entropy index, the income inequality
measured by discrepancies between income shares and population shares peaked three to
five years after Katrina. Synthetic Louisiana would exhibit income inequality levels that
are 9.5% to 13.1% lower than those observed in real Louisiana. Next, the Gini coefficient
would expand the area located under the Lorenz curve that is intuitively associated with
an increase income inequality. Here, we find income-increasing effects of economically
relevant magnitude, showing that the Gini coefficients in 2006 and 2007 were 5.5% and
6.0% higher in real Louisiana. Effects of the Atkinson index seem to set in later. For the
case of actual Louisiana in 2007, if income would have been equally distributed, the same
level of social welfare could be attained with 69.41% of total income. For the same year,
an equal level of social welfare could have been realized with 71.21% of total income in
synthetic Louisiana. This means that, in case of actual Louisiana, additional 1.8% per-
centage points of total income could be sacrificed, and is not needed, in order to attain
an equal level of social welfare.
Overall, these results confirm our previous findings of Katrina as a driver of income
inequality in Louisiana in the short-run. Our results also exhibit a high degree of consis-
tency across all the 14 inequality measures applied. We find a robust income-increasing
effect in the first year after the storm for all top income share groups except the ones
representing the next 4% and next 9%. Findings for other inequality measures further
ascertain the positive effects of Hurricane Katrina on income inequality.
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6.2.2 Sensitivity tests
Figure 5: Income inequality before and after Hurricane Katrina: Sensitivity test
Note: The top (second to top, third to top, bottom) left figure shows the trends in top 0.1% (top 1%,
next 9%, top 1% to next 9% dispersion ratio) income share in actual and synthetic Louisiana using the
average of top 0.1% (top 1%, next 9%, top 1% to next 9% dispersion ratio) in the pre-treatment period
as a predictor. The top right figure shows standardized p-values of the effect of Katrina on top 0.1%
(top 1%, next 9%, top 1% to next 9% dispersion ratio) income share.
While Figure 5 displays the trends of the top 0.1% and 1% income shares in the pre-
and post-treatment periods together with their respective standardized p-values, Figure
6 equivalently shows the trends of the next 9% income shares and the top 1% to next 9%
dispersion ratio. These alternative synthetic controls closely resemble the ones presented
in the previous subsection. For example, the alternative synthetic Louisiana for the top
1% income share consists of 30.7% Tennessee, 23.9% Texas, and 45.5% West Virginia.18
18Alternative synthetic Louisiana for the top 0.1% of the income distribution consists of 11.2% Ken-
tucky, 17.6% Tennessee, 26.1% Texas, and 45% West Virginia. Alternative synthetic Louisiana for the
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We also observe this consistency in the composition and weighting of the donor states
across the other three inequality measures. Only the dispersion ratio between the top
1% and the next 9% puts a heavy 90% weight on Kentucky.19 However, this has no
consequence to our results. The goodness of fit of these alternative synthetic controls is
comparable to the results obtained from our baseline specification. The top 1% income
share has an RMSPE of 0.0059 which is exactly the same as presented before. The
RMSPE of the next 9% income share equals to 0.0031 and is considerably lower than
the one obtained from our baseline estimation. In total, using these alternative synthetic
controls leads to similar findings in terms of algebraic sign, magnitude, and significance.
Results are not sensitive to the imposed specification change.
As a further sensitivity test, we drop West Virginia, the state with the highest weight
in every single baseline synthetic control estimation, from the donor pool. We implement
this test in order to confirm that our results are not heavily influenced by the donor
selection and in particular by the highest weight that West Virginia receives when im-
plementing the algorithm. In this case our, donor pool consists of 43 states to compose
the synthetic control. Table 5 shows the respective weights for donor states excluding
synthetic Louisiana. Across the four inequality measures presented in Table 5, the most
important state to construct the new synthetic control is Kentucky with weights ranging
from 38.4% to 90%.
Table 5: Donor pool states and share to construct synthetic Louisiana: Excluding West
Virginia
State Weight
Top 0.1% Top 1% Next9% T1/N9 ratio
Arkansas 0 0.161 0.011 0
Kentucky 0.590 0.384 0.557 0.900
New York 0 0.001 0 0.079
New Mexico 0.093 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0.021
Tennessee 0.239 0.455 0.432 0
Texas 0.078 0 0 0
Note: Only donor states with non-trivial weight are shown.
Figure 7 suggests that our results are not driven by West Virginia having a high
weight since the synthetic control without the state of West Virginia still closely tracks
actual Louisiana. As expected, the RMSPE of the trends presented in Figure 7 are higher
than the ones presented in our baseline analysis, indicating that including West Virginia
improves the fit. In terms of statistical inference, the findings do not change by excluding
West Virginia from the donor pool.20
To understand whether our results are statistically significant or not, we have es-
timated p-values following Cavallo et al. (2013) and restricted to donor states without
next 9% income shares is constructed using 14.3% Arkansas, 5.6% New York, 48.4% Tennessee, 7.6%
Texas, and 24% West Virginia.
19Alternative synthetic Louisiana for the dispersion ratio between the top 1% and next 9% is weighted
by 90% Kentucky, 7.9% New York, and 2.1% Rhode Island.
20We are not reporting the RMSPE and statistical significance of the ATE that can be estimated from
Figure 7. Results are available upon request.
25
Figure 6: The impact of Hurricane Katrina on inequality: Excluding West Virginia
Note: The figures show the trends for the baseline inequality measurements in Louisiana and synthetic
Louisiana. Synthetic Louisina is constructed excluding the state of West Virginia
high root mean squared prediction error That is, states with RMSPE 2.0 times greater
than Louisiana’s are excluded. As explained in the methodology section, we think this
is appropriate since donor states with very high RMSPE may be poorly fit and led us to
over reject. With this in mind, we re-estimate our baseline analyses, but calculate the
standardized p-values using all the donor states in the data. Figure A.1, in the appendix,
shows the trends and standardized p-values of our baseline top income share measure-
ments whereas Figure A.2 looks at the trends and standardized p-values of next 9% and
the ratio between top 1% and next 9%. Note that the p-value in 2006, the year after
Katrina, is 0.000 for the differences between observed and synthetic Louisiana for top
0.1%, top 1%, and top 1% to next 9% ratio. The difference is not statistically significant
in 2006 for the next 9%. This is in line with our baseline estimations, and in general
Figures A.1 and A.2 confirm that even when we include states with high RMSPE, the
association between Katrina and inequality is statistically significant in the first year after
the disaster.
6.2.3 Income effects
To understand the effects of Hurricane Katrina in greater detail, we explore the effects
of the storm on the average income level of the top income earners (0.1%, 1%, 10%)
and that of the rest of the distribution (bottom 90%). To ensure transparency, again
we first provide insight into the construction of the synthetic controls, then compare the
differences between actual and synthetic Louisiana, and finally perform the statistical
inference.
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Table 6: Donor pool states and share to construct synthetic Louisiana: Income effects
State Weight
Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% Bottom 90%
Alaska 0 0.029 0.004 0.014
Kentucky 0.196 0.163 0 0.275
New Mexico 0 0 0.067 0
Texas 0.29 0.338 0.395 0.301
West Virginia 0.514 0.471 0.534 0.409
Note: Only donor states with non-trivial weight are shown.
Table 6 reports the donor states with non-zero weight that we use to create the
synthetic control. As before, West Virginia is the donor state with the highest weight
across all the outcomes in Table 6. Another state with a considerable weight is Texas,
with weights that range from 29% to 39.5%.
Table 7: Average income predictor means
Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% Bottom 90%
Variables Louisiana Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Top 0.1% Average Income 1760025 1674592
Top 1% Average Income 488137.4 469112.2
Top 10% Average Income 150759.3 149249
Bottom 90% Average Income 26356.9 26338.2
Log Income per capita 8.9935 9.0007 9.0334 9.0194 9.0054
Log Population 1.3966 1.3404 1.3767 1.4009 1.3952
Log Employment 0.6713 0.5986 0.6561 0.6717 0.6776
ECF Taxation 6.5371 5.5145 5.6286 5.5952 5.6403
ECF Government Spending 6.4551 6.4545 6.4596 6.4574 6.6228
ECF Labor Market Regulations 3.3642 3.2586 3.3674 3.3157 3.4205
High School Attainment 0.4122 0.4238 0.4273 0.4301 0.4233
College Attainment 0.0863 0.0815 0.0840 0.0855 0.0831
RMSPE - 183218.9 34310.9 5999.6 755.815
Note: This table shows the predictor variables and the average pre-Katrina inequality for
observed and synthetic Louisiana.
Table 7 shows the outcome and predictor means of actual Louisiana and the synthetic
controls. In terms of predictor means, the synthetic controls closely resemble actual
Louisiana. For example, the top 10% average income in the pre-treatment period for ac-
tual Louisiana is 150,759 US dollars, whereas the value for synthetic Louisiana is 149,249
US dollars. That is, the difference between the two Louisiana is only 1,510 US dollars
which is a minor difference of about 1%.
After having created the synthetic controls, we perform an analysis on the differences.
Figure 7 looks at the trends of income among the top income earners and the rest of the
population before and after the hurricane. In 2006, the year after the disaster, the top
0.1% gained on average a whopping USD 2,062,889 (this is the difference between actual
and synthetic Louisiana in 2006). The effect of Hurricane Katrina on average income in
2006 is estimated to be USD 275,347 for the top 1% and USD 31,969 for the top 10%.
Regarding the rest of the population, the estimated impact in 2006 for the bottom 90% is
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Figure 7: Average income before and after Hurricane Katrina
Note: The figures show the trends for average income in Louisiana and synthetic Louisiana before and
after Hurricane Katrina.
of about USD 969. Surprisingly, the effect for the rest of the population is also positive. A
possible explanation for increases in income relates to rebuilding efforts in the hurricane’s
aftermath. Through an interplay between diminishing labor supply and rising demand
for construction workers, the construction industry experienced increases in earnings
and employment (Sisk and Bankston, 2014). In their study, Corey and Deitch (2011)
show that construction companies realized an average 162% increase in organizational
performance in the post-Katrina period. We need to keep in mind that this group is
very large and diverse. Due to data constraints, we cannot disentangle the possibility of
a heterogeneous effect among the rest of the population. Figure 7 also shows Hurricane
Katrina seems to create high volatility on average income for the top income earners
in the middle- and long-run. Although, we see some indications of convergence in the
trends in the long-run. With respect to the bottom 90%, Figure 7 reports that synthetic
Louisiana is always above the observed Louisiana, suggesting a positive impact on average
income.
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Table 8: The effect of Katrina on average income
Top 0.1% Top 1%
Year Effect p-value std p-value Effect p-value std p-value
2005 28722.9 0.968 0.968 -36720.9 0.576 0.576
2006 2062889 0.000 0.000 275347.2 0.000 0.000
2007 -178500.8 0.677 0.613 -52828.4 0.454 0.545
2008 3119404 0.000 0.000 405283.1 0.000 0.000
2009 538146.8 0.419 0.419 74013.3 0.575 0.606
2010 528860.4 0.452 0.452 85672.7 0.515 0.667
2011 -644670 0.516 0.452 -87061.8 0.576 0.636
2012 509345.8 0.613 0.645 83735.2 0.636 0.788
2013 563027.6 0.548 0.581 69043.6 0.545 0.757
2014 552192.5 0.548 0.581 41517.7 0.758 0.818
2015 -85156.45 0.871 0.871 -40308.3 0.727 0.788
Top 10% Bottom 90%
Year Effect p-value std p-value Effect p-value std p-value
2005 -11702.4 0.219 0.344 415.7 0.739 0.565
2006 31968.9 0.000 0.000 969.6 0.696 0.565
2007 -8071.2 0.531 0.531 8814.8 0.000 0.000
2008 47877.3 0.000 0.031 1275.8 0.696 0.565
2009 9144.3 0.531 0.594 4409.4 0.087 0.000
2010 12385.9 0.469 0.500 6084.5 0.000 0.000
2011 -13879.2 0.437 0.531 4213.3 0.174 0.043
2012 10190.9 0.687 0.719 1560.6 0.652 0.435
2013 7473.8 0.687 0.750 691.9 0.870 0.826
2014 1820.0 0.875 0.906 2205.1 0.435 0.391
2015 -6761.9 0.719 0.750 2571.9 0.435 0.304
Note: This table shows the annual treatment effects, p-values, and std p-values.
Table 8 shows the estimated treatment effects with the respective p-values. The
estimated treatment effect of Hurricane Katrina on average income for the top income
earners (0.1%, 1%, and 10%) is statistically significant in 2006 and in 2008, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the effect is zero for the other years. In both years, 2006 and
2008, the effect is positive for the top income earners and of larger magnitude, especially
for the superrich (top 0.1%). The effect of the disaster on the average income of the
bottom 90% is statistically significant at the 1% in 2007, 2009, and 2010.20 The effect
is positive in all those years. In sum, Table 8 indicates that the superrich substantially
gained after the disaster hit Louisiana and they gained at higher rates than the rest of
the population. It is also interesting to see that the bottom 90% also experienced some
gains, yet we do not know what group is gaining within the bottom 90%.
7 Conclusion
We examined the causal impact of Hurricane Katrina on income inequality in the United
States using the Synthetic Control Method. Based on a long pre-intervention period of
45 years and various predictor variables, we estimate what would have happened to the
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income distribution in Louisiana, had this state not been damaged so severely by the
devastating storm in 2005. The unique contribution of our study can be observed in
two ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to advance the understanding
of the causal relationship between Hurricane Katrina and the income distribution with
this quantitative and novel approach. This approach allows for constructing a synthetic
Louisiana, controlling for the time-varying nature of unobserved heterogeneity. Further,
to account for heterogenous income inequality effects, we employ a rich set of income
inequality measures such as top income shares, dispersion ratios and more general income
inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient.
Our estimates provide new evidence on the short- and long-run income inequality
effects of one of the most devastating natural disasters ever hit the United States. We
find that Hurricane Katrina has a short-term positive impact on top income shares for
the first year after the storm. The magnitude of this income-inequality increasing impact
is unprecedented within the period of observation and becomes larger for income share
groups closer to the top. By applying several income inequality measures, we attempt
to disentangle heterogenous effects across different income groups. The positive short-
term effect in the first year after the storm is robustly confirmed across most income
inequality measures applied. For the income groups of the next 4% and next 9%, we find
a consistently negative, but mostly insignificant, treatment effect in the post-Katrina
period. This indicates that income earners in the lower part of the top of the income
distribution are more vulnerable than top 1% income earners.
The differences between the true and synthetic Louisiana in the following years are
highly volatile. We observe two paradigm changes substantial in magnitude and mostly
with statistical significance across top income shares and dispersion ratios. A negative
one from the first to the second year followed by a positive one from the second to the
third year. This finding confirms that the strong short-term inequality-increasing effect
is not persistent. The mechanisms behind this result are yet to be identified, but our
results show that Hurricane Katrina has thoroughly shaken the income distribution at
its very top. This high volatility was felt more intensely by superrich income earners
residing in the top 0.1% income share group. Any long-term effects are not statistically
relevant and therefore negligible.
To confirm robustness of our results, we incorporate alternative inequality measures,
re-estimate of our baseline analyses by using an unrestricted calculation of standardized
p-values, and use a different composition of predictor variables. Our results remain ro-
bust to all sensitivity analyses performed. Most notably, our results for more general
income inequality measures including the Gini coefficient, the Theil’s entropy index, the
Atkinson index and the relative mean deviation, all report an inequality-increasing and
statistically significant short-term impact stemming from Hurricane Katrina. This is ad-
ditional statistical evidence that Louisiana, in a world without the Hurricane Katrina,
would have experienced a less volatile and income-increasing evolution in the short-term.
With consideration to our findings, we conclude that Hurricane Katrina has been identi-
fied as a strong driver of short-term income inequality and accelerator of a widening gap
between the rich and the poor.
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Table A.2: Donor pool states and share to construct synthetic Louisiana
State Weight
Top 5% Top 10% Next 0.9% Next 4% T01/N09 T10/B90 Gini Atkinson Theil RMD
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.076 0 0.124 0.080
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 0.104 0 0.143 0 0 0 0.276 0.079 0 0
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0.054 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0.060 0 0 0.264 0 0 0.415 0.324 0
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maryland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.183 0.136 0 0.179
New York 0 0 0.036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0.108 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 0.244 0.436 0.649 0.397 0.265 0.236 0 0.084 0.076 0
Texas 0.248 0.143 0.076 0.028 0.108 0.180 0.378 0.285 0.319 0.462
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
West Virginia 0.405 0.361 0.287 0.386 0.363 0.476 0.162 0 0.157 0.279
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.1: The top left figure shows the trends presented in the baseline analysis for the
top 0.1% income shares. The top right figure shows standardized p-values of the effect of
Katrina on the top 0.1% income shares calculated using all countries in the donor pool.
The top left figure shows the trends presented in the baseline analysis for the top 1%
income shares. The top right figure shows standardized p-values of the effect of Katrina
on the top 1% income shares calculated using all countries in the donor pool.
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Figure A.2: The top left figure shows the trends presented in the baseline analysis for in
next 9% income shares. The top right figure shows standardized p-values of the effect
of Katrina on the next 9% income shares calculated using all countries in the donor
pool. The top left figure shows the trends presented in the baseline analysis for the ratio
between top 1% to next 9%. The top right figure shows standardized p-values calculated
using all countries in the donor pool.
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Table A.6: Donor pool states and share to construct synthetic Louisiana
State Weight
Top 0.1% Top 1% Next9% T1/N9 ratio
Alaska 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 0 0 0 0
California 0 0 0 0
Colorado 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 0 0 0 0
Delaware 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 0
Idaho 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0.024 0 0.169 0.211
Maine 0 0 0 0
Maryland 0 0 0 0
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 0 0 0 0.078
New York 0 0 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0.123 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 0.227 0.312 0.303 0.172
Texas 0.252 0.234 0.074 0.248
Utah 0 0 0 0
Vermont 0 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 0
West Virginia 0.496 0.454 0.330 0.291
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 0 0
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